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JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED ON A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial process demands that a judge move within the framework
of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought for ascertain-
ing them. We must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on
every aspect of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judi-
cial robe does not change the man within it. It does. The fact is that on
the whole judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial
functions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-dis-
cipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obliga-
tion with which they are entrusted. But it is also true that reason cannot
control the subconscious influence of feelings of which it is unaware.
When there is ground for believing that such unconscious feelings may
operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to be-
lieve they are operating, judges recuse themselves. They do not sit in
judgment. They do this for a variety of reasons. The guiding considera-
tion is that the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be
disinterested as well as be so in fact.'
The reasoned opinion of a judge guides the search for truth in the
courtroom. The concern that this opinion be brought to bear fully and
fairly on reliable facts is reflected most visibly in the rules of evidence.
These rules control what may be brought into the courtroom by the
litigants. But there is also the danger that a judge may upset the bal-
ance of impartiality in the judicial process. The danger exists not be-
cause of any lack of diligence on the part of the judge but because the
judge is human, and the duty of constant, reasoned disinterestedness is
a heavy one.
To prevent influences upon the judge that might taint the judicial
process, despite the greatest diligence and rectitude, Congress has iden-
tified by statute the circumstances in which a judge must disqualify
himself from hearing a matter.2 Though statutory provisions for dis-
1. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,466-67 (1952) (separate opinion of Frank-
furter, J.).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976) provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias
or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall pro-
ceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976) provides:
1057
1058 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
qualification of a judge have been in effect since almost the turn of the
(a) Any justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or
a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a
lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity par-
ticipated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or ex-
pressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially af-
fected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either
of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially af-
fected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceed-
ing.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial inter-
ests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial inter-
ests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the
meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litiga-
tion;
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and
guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of
a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is
not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the man-
agement of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organi-
zation is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company,
of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a
"financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could
substantially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer
only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
securities.
(e) No justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy shall accept from the par-
ties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsec-
tion (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver
may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis
for disqualification.
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century,3 the Supreme Court's recent unavoidable difficulties with the
"reasonable appearance of disinterestedness" ' 4 have forced Congress to
reevaluate the mechanisms established to protect that appearance in
the federal judiciary.' The concerns reflected by Congress in the 1974
revision of 28 U.S.C. section 455 can be broken down into seven major
areas: the judge's interest in the outcome of the litigation,6 the interest
of a member of the judge's family in the outcome of the litigation,7 the
judge's -prior professional involvement in the litigation,8 the judge's
knowledge of evidentiary facts,9 the judge's relationship to persons in-
volved in the litigation,'0 the judge's impartiality in fact,"I and the ap-
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 (1976) were originally passed by Congress in 1911. See ch.
231, §§ 20-21, 36 Stat. 1090 (1911).
4. See text accompanying note 1 supra
5. Though the events precipitating the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the amend-
ment itself have been discussed extensively, see, e.g., Disqualification of Federal Judgesfor
Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236 (1978); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices
in Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736 (1973); Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Partici-
pate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1973); Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense about
Judicial Ethics, REc. A.B. N.Y. CITY 694 (1973); Traynor, Forward.- The Code Is Clear,
1972 UTAH L. REV. 333; Armstrong, The Code of Judicial Conduct, 26 Sw. L.J. 708 (1972);
Ainsworth, Judicial Ethics-A Crisis Abates, 45 TUL. L. REv. 245 (1971); Edwards, Commen-
tar, On Judicial Ethics, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 259 (1969), a short summary of those events
might be helpful. On May 14, 1969, Justice Abe Fortas resigned his seat on the United
States Supreme Court. His action was taken because a man with whom he had had financial
dealings was about to be indicted by a federal grand jury. Clement F. Haynsworth was
nominated by President Nixon to take the seat vacated by Justice Fortas. However, the
Senate refused to consent to the nomination because Judge Haynsworth had failed to dis-
qualify himself in situations where his decision to hear the case created what appeared to be
conflicts of interest. See, e.g., NOMINATION OF CLEMENT HAYNSWORTH, JR., S. EXEC. REP.
No. 91-12, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24-53 (1969). During this time, the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) began a review of its Canons of Judicial Ethics, appointing a committee which
was chaired by Roger Traynor, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California. In
1972, the ABA promulgated the work of this committee as the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT. See 58 A.B.A. J. 1207 (1972). The ABA Code was adopted without substantial
revision by the Judicial Conference of the United States in April, 1973. See H.R. REP. No.
93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6353. Also in 1972, Justice Rehnquist refused to disqualify himself in Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972), (memorandum of Rehnquist, J. at 409 U.S. 824 (1972)) despite the fact that he
had publicly expressed views on the matters relating to the case while he was an Assistant
Attorney General. See generally Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participate in Laird v.
Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1973). It was against this background that Congress in 1974
enacted Pub. L. 93-512, amending 28 U.S.C. § 455.
6. See notes 14-56 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 57-65 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 66-82 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 83-100 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 101-22 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 123-53 infra and accompanying text.
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pearance of the judge's impartiality. 2 The revision was made in 197413
and its practical effects have not yet been fully explored. Certain pre-
liminary questions have been resolved, however, and some critical
comment is possible.
II. JUDGE'S INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME OF THE PROCEEDING
Prior to its amendment in 1974, 28 U.S.C. section 455 provided that
"[any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest."'14 Disqualification for
substantial interest was mandatory. The courts usually had interpreted
"substantial interest" to mean a pecuniary or beneficial interest' 5 and
had further excluded small pecuniary or beneficial interests as non- dis-
qualifying under a de minimis rule.'6 Disqualification was required
only if the substantial interest would be affected by the judge's decision
in the litigation before him.'7 So, while ownership of stock in a corpo-
rate defendant probably required disqualification,'" ownership in a
corporation, which was the complaining witness in a prosecution for
bank robbery, did not require disqualification.' 9
Of course, an interest can be substantial without being financial in
nature. The judge could have a penal, economic, or professional inter-
est in the outcome of the case. Although a penal interest could be
12. See notes 154-77 infra and accompanying text.
13. The effective date of the amendment to § 455 was December 5, 1974. Pub. L. 93-512,
§ 3, 88 Stat. 1609, 1610.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948), ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 908.
15. See Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1099 n.15 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S.
826 (1976), and cases cited therein.
16. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 403 F.2d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 1968), on remand 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), a f'd
on appeal, 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). See also In re Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1976).
17. Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 1968), on
remand 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd on appeal, 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). Despite the fact that the wife of the judge facing recusal earned
income from long-term leases to defendant corporation, the income was held not to be of
consequence since it could not conceivably be affected by the outcome of the patent infringe-
ment claims which were the heart of the action before the judge. Nor would prior arm's
length transactions between defendant and the judge require disqualification if tliey were
unrelated to the subject matter of the action.
18. Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 324 F. Supp. at 1376.
19. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970)
(ownership of 325 of over five million outstanding shares not substantial even though stock
value was between $10,000 and $15,000). But such an interest could properly move the
judge to recuse himself under the discretionary clause of§ 455 prior to the 1974 amendment.
See notes 101-11 infra and accompanying text.
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viewed as pecuniary since criminal liability often involves a fine or
gives rise to civil parallel liability in tort for damages,2" the question of
disqualification for a penal interest is not heavily litigated and may
never be. Economic interests, such as that of a consumer in a products
liability action, can easily be regarded as pecunicary or beneficial; but
they are just as easily disregarded under the de minimis rule.2'
The least desirable consequence of construing "substantial" as pecu-
niary or beneficial was that certain professional interests were not re-
garded as disqualifying. Though a judge could not hear the appeal of a
case he had tried,22 no similar rule governed the actions of judges who
had taken to the bench from the executive or legislative branches, or
from a position of significant impact on legal policy while in the private
sector. Disquieting results arose when a judge or justice was required
to pass on the merits of some program, legislation, or national issue in
which he had previously been involved. The prosecutor who attempts
a novel application of existing criminal laws,23 the Senator who spon-
sors legislation,24 and the professor who publishes a leading treatise on
a question of national import25 might all be said to have a substantial
interest in any case that challenges the constitutional legitimacy of the
fruits of their prior actions. Should these persons, once appointed to
the federal bench, disqualify themselves from sitting on any case that,
in effect, attacks their own actions and beliefs? The answer was usually
a "no" under the mandatory "substantial interest" disqualification
clause of section 455 before its amendment.26 This answer was dictated
by the tendency of the courts to read "substantial interest" as meaning
pecunicary or beneficial interest. The inability of this or any other part
of the statute to permit a judge or justice to step away gracefully from
this apparent conflict without shirking his duty was a factor in pushing
20. Cf. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 673-74 (2d ed. 1972).
21. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1968).
23. See Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826
(1976).
24. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 831-33 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.,
discussing the participation of Justice Black in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941),
despite the fact that Justice Black, while in the Senate, had played no small part in the
enactment of the legislation under review in Darby).
25. See id. at 831-32 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's academic writings on labot and his
role in the drafting of federal labor legislation in light of his participation in United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)), a case interpreting the scope of that particular legislation.
26. See text accompanying note 14 supra; Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 831-33 (1972)
(memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). See also Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir.
1972).
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The 1974 amended version of section 455 provides a much more de-
tailed breakdown of disqualifying interests than its predecessor. The
judge has a duty to stay aware of his financial interests, whether per-
sonal or fiduciary." The amended statute defines "financial interest"
as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small ... 29
The de minimis rule is thus abrogated.30 Disqualification is required if
the judge knows that he has a "financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding."'" Disqualification is also
required if the judge knows that he has "a financial interest . . . that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."
32
Finally, disqualification is required if the judge knows that he has "any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding. 33 This provision has the effect of overruling those circuits
which had read "substantial interest" in the earlier version of the stat-
ute solely to mean a pecuniary or beneficial interest.34
What emerges from this 1974 revision is that, whether the interest is
financial or not, it must still be shown that the interest involved will be
more or less directly affected by the outcome of the proceeding before
disqualification is required. For example, recusal was properly denied
where the defendant corporation was a twice-removed subsidiary of a
corporation that did business with a company in which the judge held
stock.35 The judge had no financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy before him,36 nor in any party to the proceeding; 37 and any
27. The "duty to sit" rule compelled a judge who was not disqualified to sit in all matters
legitimately before him. A judge had to have a valid reason for recusation. Upon timely
objection by a party, a judge's decision to refuse to act on a case was subject to review.
Under the pressure of this duty to sit, most judges disqualified themselves infrequently, and
only when strictly necessary. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (memorandum
of Rehnquist, J.); Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964). This duty has
been removed by the enactment of the amended section 455. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 6353, 6355.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c) (1976), supra note 2.
29. Id. § 455(d)(4).
30. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1976), supra note 2.
32. Id. § 455(b)(5)(iii).
33. Id. § 455(b)(4).
34. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
35. Mavis v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 55, 63 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (the court
found that the judge's stock ownership was not an interest substantially affected by the out-
come of the lawsuit).
36. Id. at 62. The suit did not involve any transactions between defendant's grandparent
corporation and Union Oil, in which the judge held stock.
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interest the judge did have could not have been substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding.38 As long as the interest is financial,
the analysis of mandatory disqualification will do little to disturb prior
case law.3 9 At the same time, the explicit definitions contained in the
amended statute4° should make the analysis clearer. However, the pro-
vision that any other interest also disqualifies if substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding will cause difficulties.
A matter was commenced before a district judge involving the Vir-
ginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO),4' before the effective
date of the amendment,4" but after the adoption of the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct by the Judicial Council of the United States. 3 The
judge was a customer of VEPCO, as any resident of the VEPCO service
area would be, and the judge disqualified himself.' The fact that com-
pany customers might receive rebates or credits if VEPCO prevailed in
the action before him was held by the judge to be a disqualifying inter-
est under the amended section 455 .41 Since pre-trial proceedings had
been going on for some time prior to the disqualification, VEPCO
sought an interlocutory appeal of the order recusing the judge, seeking
in the alternative a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to hear the
case.46 The court of appeals held that the judge had erroneously ap-
37. Id. The judge held stock in Union Oil, which was not a party to the suit.
38. Id. The proceeding would not affect the value of Union Oil stock in any way.
39. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text. The major change is the elimination of
any de minimis exception. See notes 16, 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
40. A disqualifying financial interest may be personal or fiduciary in nature. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(4) (1976), supra note 2. The statute also describes certain common investment
properties and the circumstances in which they are disqualifying. Id. § 455(d)(4).
41. See Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 3, 88 Stat. 1609, 1610 (1974). The amended act does not
apply to the trial of any proceeding commenced prior to the effective date of the Act, nor to
appellate review of any proceeding which was fully submitted to the reviewing court prior to
the date of the Act. The latter provision does not refer to application by the appellate court
of the new statute to lower court judges, but to the disqualification of appellate judges them-
selves. But see Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976), where the revised § 455 was erroneously applied by the court of appeals to a
trial which commenced before the effective date of the amendment because it thought that
the fact that the appeal commenced after the effective date made the statute applicable to the
trial judge. No harm was done since disqualification was not required.
42. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the Judicial Council of the
United States in April, 1973. See note 5 supra.
43. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 407 F. Supp. 324
(E.D. Va.), vacated, 539 F.2d 357 (1976).
44. Id. at 334.
45. Id. at 329-34.
46. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 1976).
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plied the amended section 455,47 but since the applicable Canons of the
ABA Code of Judicial Conduct so closely paralleled the amended stat-
ute, and since the judge had considered the Canons in making his rul-
ing, the court of appeals went on to discuss whether the trial judge had
a disqualifying interest in the matter before him.48
First, the court dismissed the notion that the interest of a customer of
a utility company was a financial interest. The judge held at most a
"bare expectancy," 49 which is not ownership of a legal or equitable in-
terest and therefore not a disqualifying financial interest.50 The court
then ruled that this interest was not one that would be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding.5' In so ruling, the court
relied upon a dual-axis test articulated by Professor Charles Wright. 2
The remoteness of the interest and its extent are to be examined. The
more the interest resembles a direct interest, the smaller its extent may
be and still disqualify a judge. 3 While it is clear that the most direct
interest is ownership, which is a "financial interest" and therefore dis-
qualifying whatever its scope,54 what is equally clear is that the court
intends to retain a de minimis test in analyzing "other interests" that
are less direct than ownership.55 As the interest becomes less direct, the
threshold below which the interest is de minimis steadily increases.
The court held that a bare expectancy of recovering at most $100 over a
period of 40 years would be de minimis under this test, vacated the
district judge's order recusing himself, and remanded with instructions
to reconsider recusal only if the district judge felt his interest as a con-
sumer would "cloud his impartiality.
56
47. The matter had begun in the district court before the effective date of the amendment.
Id. at 366.
48. Id. at 366-68.
49. Id. at 366-67.
50. Id. at 367.
51. Id. at 367-68.
52. Id. at 368 n.16 (citing C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3547, 365 (1975)). Professor Wright himself relied in part on another com-
mentary. See Note, Disqualification ofJudges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 736 (1973).
53. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1976).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) & (d)(4) (1976), supra note 2.
55. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 369. This alternative use of the "reasonable appearance of impartiality" would
be entirely proper should the trial judge elect to recuse himself on these grounds; however, it
is unlikely that this judge would have done so. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Ship-
building & Drydock Co., 407 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D. Va.), vacated, 539 F.2d 357 (1976).
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III. INTEREST OF THE JUDGE'S FAMILY IN THE OUTCOME OF THE
PROCEEDING
Until 1974, section 455 did not require a judge to examine the inter-
ests of his family in deciding whether disqualification was required.57
The emphasis was on the judge's own "substantial interest." Though
an argument could easily be made that a judge has a substantial inter-
est in property, real and otherwise, of his spouse,58 the interests of a
judge's parents, children, or other relatives would be more difficult to
determine within the scope of section 455 prior to its amendment in
1974.59 Nor was any interest worthy of consideration that was not pe-
cuniary or beneficial.6 °
Congress changed this drastically in the 1974 amendment of section
455. All interests of a spouse of the judge, or of the judge's minor child
residing in the judge's household, are as disqualifying as the judge's
own interest.6 ' The judge simply steps into their place and evaluates
their interests as his own. He is also under a duty to make a reasonable
effort to learn of the financial interests of such spouse or minor child.62
In addition, the judge must disqualify himself if any person within
the third degree63 of relationship to him or his spouse, or the spouse of
one of these persons, has an interest known to the judge that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.6 4 No distinc-
tion is made between financial and other interests, and the de minimis
57. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948), ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (1976) provided that:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which
he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is
so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his
opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
58. See note 17 supra.
59. Whether the judge lived in a common law or community property state, he would
have certain rights in property owned by his spouse. The interest might be joint in nature, or
contingent: but it is an interest nonetheless.
60. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1976), supra note 2.
62. Id. § 455(c).
63. Children of siblings are first cousins of one another, children of first cousins are sec-
ond cousins of one another, children of second cousins are third cousins of one another; and
so forth. The children of one's first cousin are one's first cousins once removed; the children
of those children are one's first cousins twice removed; and so forth. The degrees of relation-
ship are computed by adding the degree of cousinship and the degree of removal. So the
interests of a third cousin would disqualify, while those of a third cousin once removed
would not; nor would those of a second cousin twice removed, i.e., the grandchildren of
one's second cousin.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (1976), supra note 2.
1065
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rule probably still applies.6 The requirement that the interest be
known to the judge seems designed to lessen the extension of disquali-
fying interest so far into the judge's family.
IV. JUDGE'S PRIOR PROFESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE
LITIGATION
Judges are usually attorneys by profession; this is especially true in
the federal judiciary.6 If an attorney is handling a matter for a client
and is appointed to the bench, it is unquestionable that he should not
adjudicate that matter. It is too much to ask anyone, no matter how
self-disciplined, to shift from the role of advocate to that of impartial
arbiter in a single controversy. This concern was reflected in the provi-
sion of section 455, which, prior to its amendment, required a judge to
"disqualify himself in any case in which he. . .has been of counsel."
67
Any attorney involved in a case was to disqualify himself if the same
case came before him after appointment to the judiciary. In the major-
ity of situations, this rule was not difficult to follow. The judge and at
least one of the parties would be aware of the relationship and could
easily provide for reassignment.
Most of the "of counsel" cases that arose prior to the 1974 amend-
ment involved criminal cases and judges who were former United
States Attorneys. The statute setting forth the duties of a United States
Attorney68 has been interpreted to mean that the attorney is "of coun-
sel" in any prosecution within his district. 9 Consequently, the judge
65. The abrogation of the de minimis rule applies only to financial interests. See notes
55-56 supra and accompanying text. The problem is that by using "substantially affected" in
describing family interests that are disqualifying under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (1976), Con-
gress subjects these interests, whether financial or not, to the de minimis rule expressed in
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
66. H. CHASE, S. KRISLov, K. BOYUM, & J. CLARK, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, xviii, xx (1976).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948), ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (amended 1974) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976)). See note 57 supra.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1966) provides, in part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district,
shall-
(1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States;
(2) prosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings
in which the United States is concerned.
69. The seminal case in this area is United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631, 632 (3d Cir.
1947), which has been cited as authority for more than thirty years. Vasilick was interpret-
ing a different, although substantially equivalent statute. See also In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974) (disqualification
not required in case different from that in which judge was of counsel); Gravenmier v.
United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972) (disqualification only required when judge was
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was required to disqualify himself when assigned to any case involving
the United States Attorney's office that was initiated while he was in
charge of the office.7" Most of the litigation in this area involved at-
tempts to determine when the criminal case begins. What emerges
from the decisions is a rule that a case does not begin until prosecution
is formally opened against a named defendant." Prosecution formally
begins at least upon arrest or indictment,72 not upon investigation of
particular persons.73 The United States Attorney need not make any
actual contribution to a case in order to be subject to disqualification.74
Former assistants in the office were "of counsel" only if they worked on
the case itself.
There was no reason to limit application of this "United States Attor-
ney rule" to criminal cases since it is based entirely upon the wording
of a federal statute;75 nor has it been so limited. Federal public defend-
ers are not creatures of congressional enactment as such since they usu-
ally manage their offices under authority of the judiciary to provide
counsel where constitutionally required; by clinging to the statutory ra-
tionale of the U.S. Attorney rule, federal public defenders probably are
not "of counsel" to every case their offices handle.
Although an attorney in private practice could reasonably be deemed
"of counsel" to every case handled by any member of his fi n, 7 6
thereby requiring recusal by the judge in every case handled by that
firm during the judge's employment with that firm, the problem appar-
ently did not arise under the earlier section 455.
of counsel in same case); United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130, 1133 (6th Cir. 1969)
(where judge was of counsel as former U.S. Attorney in pending case, disqualification was
mandatory); Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962) (disqualification not
required where judge has been prosecutor at trial out of which prosecution for perjury arose,
and judge is unaware of that fact).
70. See, e.g., Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1099 n.14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 826 (1976); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 268, 269 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Amerine, 411
F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (6th Cir. 1969).
71. United States v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 268, 269 (6th Cir. 1970). See In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015-16 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974).
72. United States v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 268, 269 (6th Cir. 1970).
73. Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826
(1976) ("mere questioning of a few individuals" is not enough).
74. See United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130, 1133 (6th Cir. 1969).
75. The statutory responsibility of the United States Attorney extends beyond criminal
prosecutions to all civil cases involving the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1966), supra note
68.
76. The principles of agency law make an appearance by the firm an appearance by every
lawyer in the firm. See SCA Services v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 114 (7th Cir. 1977).
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The 1974 amendment to section 455 recognizes a difference between
former practice in government employment77 and in the private sec-
tor.78 If the judge had served in government employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel or adviser concerning the proceeding,
disqualification would be required.79 However, the addition of "partic-
ipated" has been held not to affect the United States Attorney rulings
under the older version of section 455.10 If this is so, there is no reason
that the amended section 455 cannot require the disqualification of for-
mer United States Attorneys in civil cases, or of former state attorneys
where the recognized rationale applies.
The former private practitioner must disqualify himself if he or a
lawyer with whom he practiced law did, during such association, serve
"as a lawyer in the matter in controversy."' I The amended statute thus
provides for disqualification expressly where the older statute would
have had to resort to principles of agency law.82 But section 455 as now
in force really does not expand the reach of its predecessor; it merely
clarifies it.
V. JUDGE'S KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS
If a judge is a material witness to facts at issue in a case, the judge
faces a difficult task if required to sit in that case for two reasons. First,
if the judge is called by a party to testify, it is improbable that the judge
or jury can evaluate the credibility of the judge's testimony. Second,
even if the judge is not called as a witness, it is equally as difficult for
him to differentiate between personal recollections and the actual facts
in evidence. For these reasons, and to preserve the integrity of the trial,
both the amended section 455 and its predecessor provide that a judge
who is a material witness must disqualify himself.
Prior to 1974, section 455 provided that any "justice or judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he is or has
been a material witness."8 3 The mere fact that a judge was familiar
77. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (1976), supra note 2.
78. Id. § 455(b)(2).
79. Id. § 455(b)(3).
80. See United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1017 (1978), in which recusal was denied where the judge was on the bench before the
offense was discovered, investigated, or prosecuted. This may be an expansion of the older
rule. See notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (1976), supra note 2.
82. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948), ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (amended 1974) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976)). See note 57 supra.
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with the procedural and factual background of a case by reason of hav-
ing served as a judge in earlier, related cases does not require recusal.84
Such knowledge must be extrajudicial in nature before a judge may be
disqualified. 5 This requirement is nothing more than a categorical ap-
plication of a personal knowledge standard, for without such personal
knowledge a judge cannot be a material witness. Usually, exhibits and
testimony brought before a judge during litigation deal substantively
with events and other facts not directly experienced by the judge. A
judge presiding at a second trial of the same action because of a mis-
trial or remand would therefore not be disqualified as a material wit-
ness by reason of having participated in the first trial.
86
If the judge is asked to adjudicate the propriety of his own judicial
behavior, it would seem that the "extrajudicial source" rule should not
be invoked, as the judge's personal knowledge now encompasses events
relevant to the issue he must decide. Prior to the 1974 amendment, a
substantial number of the disqualification-as-material-witness cases in-
volved petitions by criminal defendants for relief from sentencing pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255.87 This is a request directed to the trial
judge that petitioner's sentence be vacated, set aside, or corrected when
passed in violation of the petitioner's rights. In these situations it seems
obvious that a trial judge would be a witness to material facts concern-
ing the granting of a section 2255 petition. The courts have discerned
in the statute, however, a congressional intent to give a section 2255
hearing the benefit of the trial judge's familiarity with the sentencing
under attack.88 One circuit has attempted to strike a balance between
these apparently conflicting statutes by allowing the trial judge to pass
upon the legal sufficiency of the petition, but disqualify himself as soon
as it is determined that a factual hearing is necessary.8 9
84. Smith v. United States, 360 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1966); Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d
511, 512 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. In general, judges are presumed to be impartial; thus unless facts are presented which
allege personal as opposed to judicial bias, the judge need not recuse himself. See United
States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977); United
States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976).
86. Cf notes 138-40 infra and accompanying text (cases cited include factual situations in
which judge's knowledge did not require recusal).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948) (amended 1949). This is often referred to as a petition for a
"writ of error coram nobis," one of the ancient writs. Strictly speaking, the writ has been
replaced by the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 procedure. See generally 18 AM. JuR. Coram Nobis and
Allied Statutory Remedies § 6 (1965).
88. See Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
880 (1974); United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 916
(1965).
89. See Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272-74 (1st Cir. 1967).
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It has also been ruled that even if the judge is a material witness, he
may issue preliminary orders without disqualification. 90 This broad as-
sertion, while perhaps justified under the older versions of section 455,
is no longer the law.91
The amended section 455 provides for judicial disqualification when
the judge has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts con-
cerning the proceeding' 92 if, while in private practice, he was a mate-
rial witness concerning the matter in controversy, 93 or if, while in
government employment, he participated as a government employee as
a material witness concerning the proceeding. 94 The amended text of
section 455 has not been extensively litigated. What the courts will do
with the specific provisions regarding knowledge gained while in pri-
vate practice or government employ is open to conjecture.95 Yet, the
change in section 455(b)(1) from "material witness" to "personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts" may be most helpful. By
splitting the notion of "material witness" into its component parts, that
is, competence and relevance of any proposed testimony of the judge-
witness, the statute clearly shows that the "extra-judicial source" rule is
not to be abandoned;96 but it also seems just as clear that a number of
circuits should consider modification of their handling of section 2255
petitions. 7 Moreover, by defining proceeding to include all "stages of
litigation," the statute probably precludes all preliminary rulings that
are not solely rulings of law.98
Contempt proceedings may be affected by the new statute. Although
summary contempt in open court remains a judicial power undisturbed
by section 455,99 criminal contempt is a different matter. One of the
90. See Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d 1151, 1156 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
921 (1970).
91. The revised § 455 expressly applies to preliminary stages of litigation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(d)(1) (1976), supra note 2.
92. Id. § 455(b)(1).
93. Id. § 455(b)(2).
94. Id. § 455(b)(3).
95. How these situations would not be covered by the provisions of§ 455(b)(1) is difficult
to imagine. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps both were included in the
private and public practice subsections to "flesh out" Congress' perception of the scope of a
lawyer's involvement in the matters he undertakes.
96. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
97. The practice of the First Circuit is perhaps the best solution. See note 89 supra and
accompanying text.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(1) (1976), supra note 2.
99. The legislative history clearly indicates this to be the case. See H.R. REP. No. 93-




issues in an action for criminal contempt is the judicial order that was
allegedly disobeyed by the defendants. That order is almost certain to
be disputed, and the issuing judge would have personal knowledge of
that disputed fact. Because of this personal knowledge, the issuing
judge would be disqualified from hearing the criminal contempt action
for failure to obey to his order. 00
VI. JUDGE'S RELATIONSHIP TO PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE
LITIGATION
Before 1974, section 455 provided that any justice or judge of the
United States should "disqualify himself in any case in which he... is
so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein."'0 1 Although the section's other three bases for
disqualification were mandatory, i e., the judge had a substantial inter-
est, 102 had been of counsel, 0 3 or had been a material witness, l° 4 dis-
qualification under this clause was clearly discretionary. "Whether a
judge is so connected with the litigation as to make it improper for him
to sit is a matter confined to the consideration and discretion of the
judge himself.' 15 This gave wide latitude to the judges and enabled
them to sit on cases where ideally they should have recused themselves;
indeed, any desire a judge might have had to remove himself from the
controversy was saddled by the "duty to sit."' 06 Reversal of a judge's
refusal to recuse himself was nearly impossible under the discretionary
"so-related" test without a showing of gross abuse of discretion. 10 7 Re-
lationships regarded as sufficient to disqualify were family ties,
08
100. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.
1974). A district court judge heard a criminal contempt case arising out of defendants' diso-
bedience to the judge's own order at another trial. Upon conviction, the defendants ap-
pealed, claiming they had been denied a fair trial. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial before a different judge. Id. at 109. The court made mention of
the "keener interest" of a judge in the outcome of a trial for contempt of his own order. Cf.
the "substantial interest" and "any interest substantially affected" cases at notes 14-56 supra.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948), ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (amended 1974) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976)). See note 57 supra.
102. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
105. Shadid v. Oklahoma City, 494 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing Weiss v.
Hunna, 312 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853 (1963)).
106. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 385 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
108. In re Eastonton Electric Co., 120 F. 1010 (S.D. Ga. 1903).
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financial involvement, 0 9 or employment." 0 These connections, how-
ever, had to be substantial before any need for recusal arose.,' The
result of all this was that the discretionary power of recusal was rarely
exercised.
In 1974, Congress amended section 455 to compel disqualification
for certain relationships between the judge and a party to the proceed-
ing, 1 2 the lawyers involved, 113 or witnesses who might be called to tes-
tify."14 If the judge or the judge's spouse is a party,"I5 or if a person
within the third degree of relationship" 6 to either of them, or that per-
son's spouse, is a party, disqualification is required. 7 If any of these
persons is an officer, director, or trustee of a party, disqualification is
required." 8 If any of these persons is acting as a lawyer, 19 or is to the
judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding,
20
disqualification is required. Finally, the judge must disqualify himself
if a lawyer with whom he practiced law is a material witness.
12
By adding witnesses to the group of persons with whom the judge's
out-of-court relationship requires recusal, Congress has lifted the heavy
burden of forcing the judge to make impartial assessments of the credi-
bility of persons close to him. There is little doubt that a federal judge
would in fact strain to make an impeccably fair evaluation of such per-
sons if called as witnesses before them.' 22 There is no reason to risk,
109. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lawrenson, 34 F.R.D. 121 (D. Md.), afd,
334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964).
110. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
111. See United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1974) (judge had attended a
related bankruptcy proceeding while in private practice and had asked one of the parties to
the suit now before him at most one question; held not so related to that party as to require
disqualification). See also Scarrella v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan, 536 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976) (petitioner attempted to disqualify the court of appeals
judges because of their relationship to the legal profession and the financial workings of
Minnesota (perhaps petitioner forgot that he was in federal court); held not sufficient inter-
est, even if petitioner had filed suit against the American and Minnesota State Bar Associa-
tions).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i) (1976), supra note 2.
113. Id. § 455(b)(5)(ii).
114. Id. § 455(b)(5)(iv).
115. Id. § 455(b)(5)(i).
116. See note 63 supra.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i) (1976), supra note 2.
118. Id.
119. Id. § 455(b)(5)(ii).
120. Id. § 455(b)(5)(iv).
121. Id. § 455(b)(2).
122. Indeed, some judges might be more critical of those close to them than of people
they did not know. See also note I supra and accompanying text.
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however, the possibly adverse effects to the judge's personal and social
life by demanding that such assessments be made.
VII. JUDGE'S IMPARTIALITY IN FACT
Until its amendment in 1974, section 455 contained no provision for
disqualification of a judge because of prejudice or bias towards a party.
Such a disqualification was possible, however, under 28 U.S.C. section
144. '23 The party desiring disqualification filed with the court an affi-
davit demonstrating the bias or prejudice of the judge before whom the
matter was pending.1 24 The judge originally assigned could take no
further action on the matter, and the proceeding was assigned to an-
other judge.12  This remedy, though still available after the 1974
amendment of section 455, is available only at the district court level. 1
26
If the proceeding is pending, such an affidavit would quite normally
come before the very judge who is the target of the party's allegations
of bias. It might be said that the judge should disqualify himself from
taking the affidavit under consideration, let another judge rule on its
sufficiency, and then proceed to hear the matter or not as dictated by
the findings of his colleague. However, in Berger v. United States,1
2 7
the United States Supreme Court interpreted the version of section 144
then in effect to mean that the judge against whom the affidavit was
directed could properly pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit,
and should recuse himself from any further participation in the under-
lying proceeding if the affidavit "show[s] the objectionable inclination
or disposition of the judge."'128 The judge was not to examine the facts
alleged for their truth.129 Though the potential for abuse by an affiant
willing to lie was recognized, the Court left this problem to Congress, 3 °
and the statute has been so applied ever since.'
31




127. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
128. Id. at 35.
129. Id. at 36.
130. Id. at 36-37. Congress was not as concerned as the dissenters in Berger, for it has not
amended the statute to correct what those justices thought was a defect in the majority hold-
ing.
131. See United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 1213 (1979); King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850
(1978); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
902 (1977). But see Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 105-06 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gee,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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The facts that are legally sufficient to require a judge to recuse him-
self must be discussed. The facts must be sufficient to convince a rea-
sonable person that the judge possesses bias or prejudice in the
matter. 132 That this places a substantial burden on the moving party is
undeniable. 133 Additionally, "[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be
disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source, and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case."' 134 This requirement stems from the
statutory language that declares that the bias or prejudice must beper-
sonal.135 Finally, the facts must be alleged specifically in the affidavit;
mere conclusionary language of bias or prejudice will not suffice.'
36
It is not sufficient, therefore, to show that the judge has ruled ad-
versely to the interests of a party,137 presided at the proceeding in a
related matter, 138 retried the case after a hung jury139 or reversal and
remand by an appellate court,14° or made strong comments about a
party, as long as no showing can be made that the feelings expressed by
the judge were based on something other than what he has learned
while presiding over the matter.' 41 Nor is it sufficient to show that the
132. Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976); Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524
F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Curry v. Jensen, 523 F.2d 387,
388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975); United States v. Baker, 441 F. Supp. 612,
616 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
133. United States v. Baker, 441 F. Supp. 612, 616 (M.D. Tenn. 1977); Molinara v. Wat-
kins-Johnson CEI Division, 359 F. Supp. 474, 476 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. Thomas,
299 F. Supp. 494, 498 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
134. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1978), supra note 2.
136. United States v. Anderson, 433 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1970).
137. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921); United States v. Azhocar, 581
F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1213 (1979); Maret v. United States, 332
F. Supp. 324, 325-26 (E.D. Mo. 1971). Even if such rulings are erroneous, the proper rem-
edy is reversal on appeal, not disqualification.
138. See United States v. Gullion, 575 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1978) (judge presided at trial
of co-defendants); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
903 (1977) (judge took guilty plea of a co-defendant); United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d
257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909 (1977) (likening a separate trial of a co-
defendant to an evidence suppression hearing as to its effect on a judge's presumed lack of
prejudice).
139. See United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903
(1977).
140. See NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236 (1947); Mayberry v. Ma-
roney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1162 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 639 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977). But cf, Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d
1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1977) (court reversed a summary judgment awarded by trial judge and
remanded the proceeding to a different trial judge since the circumstances of the granting of
the motion for summary judgment indicated prejudgment by first trial judge).
141. United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907
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judge in attempting to resolve the conflict before the court has indi-
cated his opinion of the strength of a party's case,'4 2 or has taken ac-
tions reasonably designed to move the matter along or preserve the
decorum of the proceedings.'43 Nor is mere prior knowledge of facts
concerning a party sufficient to require disqualification. 44
Section 144 has severe limitations, however. First, it does not apply
to judges above the district court level. 45 Second, absent good cause,
the affidavit must be filed at least ten days before the beginning of the
term at which the proceeding is to be heard. 46 Such a time require-
ment allows the judge to find a waiver of the right to petition for
recusal under section 144. Lastly, there is no requirement in the statute
that the judge recuse himself when he is aware of facts that would, if
drafted into an affidavit, be sufficient to warrant recusal.147
When Congress amended section 455 in 1974, it included a require-
ment that any judge or justice of the United States must "disqualify
himself. . . where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party."' 148 This amendment and section 144 have been construed to be
(1979). The trial judge told petitioner's co-defendant at the co-defendant's arraignment that
he should not rely on petitioner as a witness. This was held not to be personal bias or
prejudice since the source of the judge's opinion was not extrajudicial. Nor was it evidence
of bias that the judge told the petitioner that he would receive the maximum sentence if
convicted. Id. at 739-40. See United States v. Baker, 441 F. Supp. 612, 618-20 (M.D. Tenn.
1977); United States v. Corr, 434 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
142. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966).
143. See In re Georgia Paneling Supply, Inc., 581 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1978) (ex parte
conferences with other parties without more is not sufficient to show collusion and bias);
United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (citing
defendant for contempt is at most judicial bias); United States v. Corr, 434 F. Supp. 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (suggesting a stipulation to the testimony of a witness to save defendant's
lawyer a conflict of interest problem is not evidence of bias or prejudice); Lazofsky v. Som-
merset Bus Co., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (admonishing plaintiff, who
was also an attorney, to behave while on the witness stand is not evidence of bias).
144. See United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
931 (1977); United States v. Baker, 441 F. Supp. 612, 618 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). A prior adver-
sary relationship to a party is apparently not sufficient either, without more. See In re Con-
tinental Vending Mach. Corp., 543 F.2d 986, 995, 996 (2d Cir. 1976) (judge had testified
against defendant; his refusal to recuse himself was not reversed, but he was strongly urged
to reconsider his decision); United States v. Maroney, 280 F. Supp. 277, 279 (W.D. Pa. 1968)
(the presiding judge, while district attorney, had tried a criminal case against defendant
which resulted in acquittal).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1976), supra note 2.
146. Id.
147. Id. The matter was left to the conscience of the trial judge. See note 1 supra and
accompanying text.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1976), supra note 2.
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equivalent. 149 While this is probably a workable result, it may militate
against Congress' attempt to repair certain shortcomings in section
144.150 The courts have recognized that the inclusion of bias or
prejudice grounds in section 455 expands the alternatives by which a
party may seek relief, and also requires the judge to recuse himself if he
is aware not only of bias in fact, but of facts that make a reasonable
showing of bias. 5' Because the requirement of personal bias remains
unchanged,152 the cases establishing the extrajudicial bias rule are still
in force, and the statistical likelihood of bias or prejudice disqualifica-
tion is slight.1 53
VIII. APPEARANCE OF JUDGE'S IMPARTIALITY
The 1974 amendment of section 455 begins: "Any justice, judge,
magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United States shall disqual-
ify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned."' 54 This is the heart of the revised statute, and is
essentially an enactment of the general principles of recusal as formu-
lated by Justice Frankfurter.'55 Though the specific situations requir-
ing disqualification are simply legislative determinations that certain
circumstances fall within the general standard,' 56 in practice the "ap-
pearance of impartiality" test functions as a backdrop to the other pro-
visions.
57
149. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975); Parrish v.
Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 102 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975).
150. By so construing the two statutes, do the courts intend to preclude the judge from
making an evidentiary inquiry under § 455(b)(1), which is forbidden under § 144? See notes
127-30 supra and accompanying text.
151. See Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 102 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975), and cases
cited therein.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1976), supra note 2.
153. The likelihood that persons whom a judge knows and dislikes off the bench will
come before him as litigants is not great; when the requirement that the motion for recusal
make some showing of facts indicating bias or prejudice is added, the likelihood that this
section will be used successfully becomes even smaller.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1976), supra note 2.
155. See note I supra and accompanying text.
156. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6353, 6355.
These specific situations in subsection (b) are in addition to the general standard set
forth in subsection (a). Thus, by setting specific standards, Congress can eliminate the
uncertainty and ambiguity arising from the language in the existing statute and will
have aided the judges in avoiding possible criticism for failure to disqualify themselves.
All the situations in subsection (b) are circumstances in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
157. See id. at 6354.
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
In SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan,"' a district judge refused to recuse
himself despite the fact that one of the parties before him was repre-
sented by a law firm in which the judge's brother was a partner. The
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to assign the
case to another judge. Three justifications for recusal were examined.
Though the petition was granted, the court of appeals declined to hold
that a disqualifying relationship existed between the judge and the law-
yer from his brother's firm.159 The court construed "acting as a lawyer
in the proceeding"'160 to require active participation,161 but issued the
writ on the grounds that the judge's brother had an interest that would
be substantially affected by the outcome of the lawsuit.'62
Although not directly presented in SCA Services, the Seventh Circuit
also indicated that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was reversible
since a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'63 The court recognized
that the use of a "reasonableness" test meant that the circumstances
would have to be viewed objectively. Considering the relevant facts
and circumstances, the test is whether a reasonable person could infer
that the judge's impartiality might be questionable.164 The existence of
a reasonable inference of partiality is sufficient to disqualify a judge.
65
Applying this test or its equivalent, the court in SCA Services held that
the fact that the trial judge's brother's law firm represented a party
raised a reasonable question of the judge's impartiality.
66
The general standard of impartiality established in section 455(a) "is
designed to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judi-
cial process."'167 This purpose would not be effectuated by viewing the
158. 557 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1977).
159. Id. at 114.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (1976), supra note 2.
161. 557 F.2d at 114. Compare this with the judge's prior participation in the action. The
standard is much stricter on the judge. See notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
162. 557 F.2d at 115-16. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (1976), supra note 2.
163. 557 F.2d at 115-16. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1976), supra note 2. However, a petition
for writ of mandamus is only granted to overturn a refusal to disqualify on mandatory
grounds. The "appearance of impartiality" requirement is not strictly mandatory, for a rea-
sonableness test applies; therefore, by granting the writ of mandamus, the court renders its
language on the "appearance of impartiality" as dictum.
164. Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit did
not have an easy time applying its own test, however. In fact, it should not have applied it at
all. Id., at 104-05 (Roney, J., specially concurring).
165. Id. at 103-04.
166. 557 F.2d at 116.
167. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nnws 6353, 6355.
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matter from the perspective of a reasonable judge or lawyer rather than
that of a lay person. In United States ex rel Weinberger v. Equpfax,
Inc. ,16 however, the Fifth Circuit seems to have used a narrow stan-
dard of reasonableness. In that case, the judge's son was an associate of
the law firm representing one of the parties. The court distinguished
SCA Services on the grounds that an associate's interest in the firm is
not as great as a partner's and so would not be as substantially af-
fected. 69 Perhaps this holding is justified. 170 But the court's further
refusal to consider the facts as raising a reasonable question of the
judge's impartiality is nothing less than an avoidance of the expressed
purpose of the amendment. 17  While the consequences of so holding
would possibly put a burden upon any firm which hires the relatives of
a judge,172 it is a simple matter to avoid the problem.'73 But more im-
portantly, in balancing the necessity of public respect for the judiciary
with the practicalities of the administration of justice, Congress has im-
plied that the latter must give way to the former.
174
On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that a fair portion of the
cases interpreting the amended statute will reflect misguided attempts
by trial counsel to use the revised provisions as a tool for judge shop-
ping. '5 Such attempts were thwarted under the pre-1974 statute,' 76
168. 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977).
169. Id. at 463 ("[ilt is undisputed that the district judge's son did not actively participate
in Equifax's defense." (emphasis added)).
170. Id. The Fifth Circuit termed an associate's salary interest as "too remote" to fall
within the "financial interest" provision. It would have been better to have said that a salary
interest is not an ownershp interest. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) (1976), supra note 2.
171. See 557 F.2d at 464. Cf. note 167 supra and accompanying text. Congress did not
attempt to change the standard of review from discretion of the trial judge, but the Fifth
Circuit made no attempt to see a narrower range of discretion after the creation of an objec-
tive standard in § 455(a). The approach of the Fifth Circuit makes § 455(a) a dead letter.
Considering the ballyhoo involved in revising the statute, their decision to do so is ill-ad-
vised. See note 5 supra.
172. The firm would be unable to appear before that particular judge.
173. In most districts, there is more than one judge, so that all judges are able to exchange
cases. In a one-judge district, the consequences would be more severe. But recall that Jus-
tice Tom Clark resigned from the United States Supreme Court so that his son could be-
come United States Attorney General. This is a matter that the family should resolve before
the problem comes up.
174. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
175. Congress anticipated this use of the revised statute. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6353, 6355.
176. See the extrajudicial requirements on material witness and bias disqualifications at
notes 83-86 and 132-44 supra. Also consider the United States Attorney disqualifications at
notes 68-75 supra.
JUDICIAL DISQ UALIFICA TION
and face the same prospects under the current enactment. 77 There is a
great hue and cry today about the scarce resources of judicial adminis-
tration, and any statute providing that certain judges cannot hear cer-
tain cases will do nothing to ease those pressures. Furthermore, a
disqualified judge is probably not a happy one, because, no matter how
it is phrased, recusal under section 455 means that there is something
about a particular judge that makers of policy feel prevents him from
executing his office in a particular set of circumstances. However,
nearly all the stigma could be removed if the trial bar and bench ap-
proached the disqualification question with an eye to the primary pur-
pose of the revised statute. Not only would unnecessary strain on the
judicial system be avoided, but disqualification might occur more eas-
ily and with better results.
Patrick J Ryan
177. None of the old safeguards have been removed. See notes 80, 96, & 149 supra and
accompanying text.
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